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Abstract 
In a first psychological investigation of moral perfectionism, Yang, Stoeber, and Wang (2015) 
adapted items from the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale to differentiate 
perfectionistic personal moral standards and concern over moral mistakes. Examining a sample 
of Chinese students, Yang et al. found that personal moral standards showed unique positive 
relationships with moral values, virtues, and judgments, whereas concern over moral mistakes 
did not. The present study aimed to replicate Yang et al.’s findings in a sample of Western 
students (N = 243), additionally including measures of moral identity and moral disengagement. 
Furthermore, the study examined whether moral perfectionism explained variance in moral 
attitudes beyond general perfectionism. Results largely replicated Yang et al.’s findings. Personal 
moral standards (but not concern over moral mistakes) showed unique positive relationships with 
moral values, virtues, and judgments and a unique negative relationship with moral 
disengagement. Furthermore, moral perfectionism explained significant variance in moral 
attitudes beyond general perfectionism. The present findings suggest that moral perfectionism is 
a personality characteristic that is relevant in both Asian and Western cultures and explains 
individual differences in moral attitudes beyond general perfectionism.  
Keywords: moral perfectionism; personal standards; concern over mistakes; moral values; 
virtues; moral judgments; moral identity; moral disengagement  
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Perfectionism dimensions and domains 
Perfectionism is a multidimensional personality disposition characterized by exceedingly 
high standards accompanied by concerns over mistakes and other people’s evaluations (Frost, 
Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990; Hewitt & Flett, 1991). Factor analytic studies comparing 
different measures of multidimensional perfectionism consistently find two higher-order 
dimensions referred to as personal standards perfectionism and evaluative concerns 
perfectionism (Dunkley, Blankstein, Halsall, Williams, & Winkworth, 2000). Personal standards 
perfectionism captures the exceedingly high personal standards of perfectionistic people and 
their striving for perfection. In comparison, evaluative concerns perfectionism captures their 
concern over mistakes and fear of others’ negative evaluations should they fail to live up to their 
perfectionistic standards (see Stoeber & Otto, 2006, for a review).  
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Multidimensional perfectionism is often domain-specific (Dunn, Gotwals, & Causgrove, 
2005; McArdle, 2010). Few people high in perfectionism are perfectionistic in all domains of life 
(Stoeber & Stoeber, 2009). Consequently, perfectionism research has started to use domain-
specific measures of perfectionism to capture individual differences in perfectionism in specific 
areas of life such as sports, parenting, sexuality, and physical appearance (see Yang, Stoeber, & 
Wang, 2015, for references). What is more, domain-specific measures of perfectionism have 
been found to be better predictors of domain-specific characteristics, processes, and outcomes 
than general measures of perfectionism (Dunn, Craft, Causgrove Dunn, & Gotwals, 2011; 
Stoeber & Yang, 2015) affirming that research on domain-specific forms of perfectionism is a 
worthwhile endeavor.  
1.2. Moral perfectionism  
Against this background, Yang et al. (2015) introduced the construct of moral perfectionism 
as a domain-specific form of perfectionism specifically related to morality. Moral perfectionism 
has a long tradition in philosophy, but has been largely neglected in psychological research (see 
Yang et al., 2015, for details). Consequently, Yang et al.’s study was the first psychological 
investigation of moral perfectionism and its relationships with moral values, virtues, and 
judgments.  
To differentiate personal standards and evaluative concerns aspects of moral perfectionism, 
Yang et al. (2015) adapted items of the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al., 
1990) to measure perfectionistic personal moral standards and concern over moral mistakes. 
Examining a large sample of Chinese university students, they found both dimensions of moral 
perfectionism to show positive correlations with moral values, virtues, and judgments. However, 
when partial correlations controlling for the overlap between the two dimensions were regarded, 
only personal moral standards continued to show positive relationships with moral values, 
virtues, and judgments (except for gratitude and indebtedness). In contrast, concern over moral 
mistakes ceased to show positive relationships (except with indebtedness), but showed a negative 
relationship with self-reliance (one of the virtues).  
Yang et al.’s (2015) findings suggest that moral perfectionism is a domain-specific form of 
perfectionism that explains individual differences in moral values, virtues, and judgments. In this, 
the personal standards dimension of moral perfectionism seems to be of primary importance. The 
evaluative concerns dimensions—once its overlap with the personal standards dimension is 
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controlled for—shows few (if any) positive relationships with moral values, virtues, and 
judgments, or may even show negative relationships. 
Yang et al.’s (2015) study had a number of limitations. First, because it was the first 
psychological study investigating moral perfectionism, the study was largely exploratory, so the 
findings should be replicated. Second, Yang et al. (2015) examined Chinese students. Chinese 
students, however, may have different views of morality than Western students (e.g., Jackson et 
al., 2008). Moreover, multidimensional perfectionism may show different relationships in Asian 
and Western students (e.g., Chang, Chang, & Sanna, 2012; Stoeber, Kobori, & Tanno, 2013). 
Consequently, Yang et al.’s (2015) findings need to be reinvestigated with Western students. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Yang et al. did not measure general perfectionism.1 
Consequently, it is unclear whether their findings are specific to moral perfectionism. To 
demonstrate the usefulness of moral perfectionism as a psychological construct, it would be 
important to show that moral perfectionism explains variance in moral values, virtues, and 
judgments beyond variance explained by general perfectionism.  
1.3. The present study  
Against this background, the present study had two aims. First, it sought to replicate Yang 
et al.’s (2015) findings in a sample of Western students, including moral identity and moral 
disengagement in addition to moral values, virtues, and judgments. Second, it examined whether 
moral perfectionism explained variance in moral attitudes (i.e., moral values, virtues, judgments, 
identity, and disengagement) beyond variance explained by general perfectionism. In line with 
Yang et al.’s (2015) findings, we expected personal moral standards and concern over moral 
mistakes to show different patterns of unique relationships with moral attitudes. Specifically, we 
expected personal moral standards to show positive relationships with moral values, virtues, 
judgments, and identity, and a negative relationship with moral disengagement. In contrast, we 
expected concern over moral mistakes to show nonsignificant or negative relationships with 
moral values, virtues, judgments, and identity, and a nonsignificant or positive relationship with 
moral disengagement. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants  
A sample of 243 students (41 men, 202 women) studying at the University of Kent was 
recruited via the School of Psychology’s research participation scheme. Mean age of students 
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was 20.1 years (SD = 3.8). Students volunteered to participate for extra course credit or a £50 
raffle and completed all measures online using the School’s Qualtrics® platform, which required 
to respond to all questions to prevent missing data.  
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. Moral perfectionism  
To measure moral perfectionism, we followed Yang et al. (2015) and adapted the 16 items 
from the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (FMPS; Frost et al., 1990) capturing 
personal standards and concern over mistakes to measure moral perfectionism: the Personal 
Standards subscale items to capture personal moral standards (e.g., “I have extremely high moral 
standards”), and the Concern over Mistakes subscale items to capture concern over moral 
mistakes (“I should be upset if I make a moral mistake”). Participants were told that the items 
reflected moral standards and expectations, and responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree). (See Supplementary Material, Section 1 for instructions and items.) 
2.2.2. General perfectionism 
To measure general perfectionism, we used the same 16 items from the FMPS in their 
original form: the Personal Standards items to capture general personal standards (“I have 
extremely high goals”), and the Concern over Mistakes items to capture general concern over 
mistakes (“I should be upset if I make a mistake”). Participants were told that the items reflected 
personal standards and expectations, and responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree).  
2.2.3. Moral values 
To measure moral values, we used the Moral Values subscale of the Adolescents’ Value 
Scale (Chen, 2008; English translation: Yang et al., 2015). The subscale comprised 15 items 
describing moral values (e.g., honesty, kindness, respect for others). Participants indicated how 
important these values were to them on a scale from 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very important).  
2.2.4. Virtues 
To measure virtues, we used the 48-items Virtues Scale (Cawley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000) 
capturing empathy (“I am able to sympathize with the feelings of others…”), order (“I keep my 
things cared for and well ordered…”), resourcefulness (“I have confidence in my skills and 
abilities…”), and serenity ( “I am calm and unruffled…”). Participants were asked to indicate to 
what degree the items represented their real virtues on a scale from 1 (least like you really are) to 
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7 (most like you really are). 
2.2.5. Forgiveness judgment 
To measure forgiveness, we used the forgiveness vignette from Girard and Mullet (1997, p. 
212, “Marie-Noelle and Josiane…” ). Following Yang et al. (2015), we replaced “sisters” with 
“classmates” and deleted the social-pressure element and the information that Josiane was 
promoted eventually. Furthermore, we changed the names to Alex and Sam (which, in Britain, 
are used for both men and women) to make the vignette gender-neutral (see Supplementary 
Material, Section 2 for details). Participants were asked whether they would forgive Alex if they 
were Sam, and responded on a scale from 0 (sure – NO) to 10 (sure – YES).  
2.2.6. Gratitude judgments 
To measure gratitude judgments, we used the gratitude vignette from Watkins, Scheer, 
Ovnicek, and Kolts (2006, p. 227, “You have met someone in one of your classes…”) describing 
the situation that a classmate notices that you miss a class, and the next week comes to class with 
a photocopy of their notes from last week’s class for you.2 Participants were asked how they 
would feel in this situation with three items capturing gratitude (grateful, thankful, appreciatory) 
and three items indebtedness (indebted [feel like you owe]), obligated, sense of duty). In addition, 
following Yang et al. (2015), we measured willingness to help. Participants were asked how they 
would react if, one day, the classmate has a problem and needs help, and were presented with 
two items (“I would help him/her as best as I can,” “I would help him/her again if he/she needs 
help in the future”). Participants responded to all items on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very 
much). 
2.2.7. Wrong behavior judgments  
To measure wrong behavior judgments, we used the Moralization of Everyday Life Scale 
(Lovett, Jordan, & Wiltermuth, 2012). The scale comprises 30 items describing behaviors that 
may be considered morally wrong, forming six subscales with five items each: deception (“Lying 
about a test score when reporting performance to a teacher”), disregard for others (“Parking in a 
‘handicapped’ parking spot when not handicapped”), failure to do good (“Ignoring a driver 
whose car is stuck in the snow”), laziness (“Feeling too tired to do laundry, so lying around in 
dirty clothes”), bodily violations comprising behaviors that involve the ingestion of foreign 
substances such as drugs, certain sexual behaviors, and willful bodily disfigurement (“Getting a 
large tattoo covering the face and neck”), and disgusting behaviors (“Defecating, not washing 
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one’s hands, and then preparing dinner for oneself”). Participants indicated how much they 
considered the behaviors morally wrong on a scale from 0 (not wrong at all; a perfectly ok 
action) to 6 (very wrong; an extremely immoral action).  
2.2.8. Moral identity 
To measure moral identity, we used the Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
Participants were presented with a list of moral traits (caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, 
generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind). They were asked to vividly imagine the kind of 
person who has these traits and then respond to 13 items capturing internalization (“Being 
someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am”) and symbolization of 
moral identity (“I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these 
characteristics”) on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
2.2.9. Moral disengagement 
To measure moral disengagement, we used the eight marker items of the Propensity to 
Morally Disengage Scale (Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012, Appendix A, bold-
faced items) capturing various aspects of moral disengagement (“It is okay to spread rumors to 
defend those you care about”). Participants indicated their agreement with the items on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
2.3. Data Screening  
Scale scores were computed by averaging responses across items. Because multivariate 
outliers distort the results of correlation and regression analyses, we excluded five participants 
with a Mahalanobis distance larger than ²(22) = 48.27, p < .001, so the final sample comprised 
238 participants. Next, we examined whether the variance-covariance matrices of male and 
female participants differed by computing a Box’s M test. Because Box’s M is highly sensitive to 
even minor differences, it is tested against a p < .001 significance level (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Box’s M was nonsignificant with p = .052. Consequently, all analyses were collapsed 
across gender. Finally, we examined the reliabilities of the scale scores by computing 
Cronbach’s alphas. All scores showed satisfactory alphas > .70 except disregard for others which 
showed an acceptable alpha (.68; see Tables 1 and 2).  
3. Results  
3.1. Moral perfectionism and general perfectionism 
First, we examined the bivariate correlations between the perfectionism dimensions (see 
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Table 1). In line with previous findings (Yang et al., 2015), personal moral standards and 
concern over mistakes were most strongly correlated (r = .70), but also showed medium- to 
large-sized correlations with the respective dimensions of general perfectionism (.35 ≤ rs ≤ .64) 
confirming that moral perfectionism and general perfectionism show significant overlap. 
Consequently, we examined the partial correlations between each of the dimensions controlling 
for the other dimensions. As expected, the partial correlation showed a pattern in which 
corresponding dimensions (e.g., personal moral standards, personal standards) showed positive 
correlations across domains (moral perfectionism, general perfectionism) whereas non-
corresponding dimensions (e.g., personal moral standards, concern over mistakes) showed 
negative correlations (see again Table 1).  
3.2. Moral perfectionism and moral attitudes 
Next, we examined the bivariate correlations between the two dimensions of moral 
perfectionism and the moral attitudes (see Table 2). Personal moral standards showed positive 
correlations with moral values, all virtues, all gratitude judgments, three of the wrong behavior 
judgments (deception, disregard for others, failure to do good), and both aspects of moral 
identity. In contrast, concern over moral mistakes also showed positive correlations with moral 
values and both aspects of moral identity, but only with three of the virtues (empathy, order, 
serenity), one of the gratitude judgments (indebtedness), and two of the wrong behavior 
judgments (deception, disregard for others).  
To examine the unique relationships of the two dimensions, we computed multiple 
regressions and inspected the dimensions’ semipartial correlations (see again Table 2). In line 
with Yang et al.’s (2015) findings, personal moral standards continued to show the same pattern 
of significant correlations as in the bivariate correlations, with three exceptions: The positive 
correlations with indebtedness and disregard for others became nonsignificant, whereas the 
negative correlation with moral disengagement became significant. In contrast, all positive 
correlations of concern over moral mistakes became nonsignificant once the overlap with 
personal moral standards was controlled for (with the exception of symbolization of moral 
identity). Moreover, three correlations changed signs and were now significant negative 
(resourcefulness, gratitude, willingness to help). In addition, concern over moral mistakes now 
showed a significant positive correlation with moral disengagement.  
3.3. Moral perfectionism versus general perfectionism and moral attitudes 
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Finally, we examined whether moral perfectionism explained variance in moral attitudes 
beyond general perfectionism, we conducted a series of hierarchical regression analyses with two 
steps. In Step 1, we simultaneously entered the two dimensions of general perfectionism as 
predictors. In Step 2, we simultaneously entered the two dimensions of moral perfectionism as 
further predictors. Then we inspected the semipartial correlations (see Table 3).  
Results showed that moral perfectionism explained variance beyond general perfectionism 
regarding all moral attitudes, with only four exceptions: the virtue of resourcefulness and the 
wrong behavior judgments regarding laziness, bodily violations, and disgusting behaviors. To 
examine how much variance the two dimensions of moral perfectionism explained in moral 
attitudes compared to the two dimensions of general perfectionism, we compared the R² values 
in Table 2 with those of Step 1 in Table 3. Moral perfectionism explained on average of 7.6% 
variance in moral attitudes, whereas general perfectionism explained on average of 4.5%. What 
is more, an inspection of the R² values of Step 2 in Table 3 showed that moral perfectionism 
explained on average an additional 5.3% variance in moral attitudes beyond general 
perfectionism. 
4. Discussion 
4.1. The present findings  
The aim of the present study was to replicate Yang et al.’s (2015) findings in a sample of 
Western students and to examine whether moral perfectionism explained variance in moral 
attitudes beyond general perfectionism. Results showed that the present findings by and large 
replicated Yang et al.’s findings. Moreover, moral perfectionism explained a significant 
percentage of variance in moral attitudes beyond general perfectionism.  
Comparing the semipartial correlations from the multiple regressions of our study (see 
Table 2) with the partial correlations of Yang et al.’s (2015) study, our study confirmed the 
general pattern of Yang et al.’s findings: Once the overlap between the two dimensions of moral 
perfectionism was controlled for, only personal moral standards showed positive correlations 
with moral values, virtues, and judgments. There were, however, some notable differences 
between the studies. In Yang et al.’s study, personal moral standards showed a nonsignificant 
correlation with gratitude, whereas in our study it showed a positive correlation. In Yang et al.’s 
study, personal moral standards showed positive correlations with all wrong behavior judgments, 
whereas in our study it showed positive correlations with only two of the five wrong behavior 
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judgments: deception and failure to do good (but not disregard for others, laziness, and bodily 
violations). Note, however, that whereas personal moral standards alone was unrelated to 
disregard for others, personal moral standards and concern over moral mistakes combined 
explained significant variance in disregard for others (see Table 2, R²). Furthermore, concern 
over moral mistakes showed some notable differences. In Yang et al.’s study, concern over 
moral mistakes showed a positive correlation with indebtedness, but not in our study. In Yang et 
al.’s study, concern over moral mistakes showed a nonsignificant correlation with 
resourcefulness. In our study, it showed a significant negative correlation.  
How can we explain these differences? On possible explanation is that Yang et al. (2015) 
examined Chinese students whereas our study examined Western students. Therefore, the 
differences may reflect cultural differences. In particular, indebtedness is seen as negative in the 
Chinese culture (e.g., Zhao, 2010) which may explain the positive relationships with concern 
over moral mistakes in Yang et al.’s study. Another possible explanation is that—with the 
exception of moral values—the two studies used different measures. As regards resourcefulness, 
Yang et al. measured virtues with an adjective rating scale based on Cawley et al.’s (2000) 
Virtues Scale, whereas we used Cawley et al.’s (2000) scale. Moreover, the adjective rating scale 
measured resourcefulness with 17 items, whereas Cawley et al.’s scale measured it with 11 items. 
Hence, resourcefulness in Yang et al.’s study may have been a different/broader concept than 
resourcefulness in our study. As regards the gratitude judgments (gratitude, indebtedness, 
willingness to help), Yang et al. used an adapted version of Watkins et al.’s (2006) vignette in 
which a friendly student provides copies of previous exam papers and course notes and thereby 
helps the protagonist get into a prestigious university. We used the original version of the 
vignette in which a friendly student merely provides course notes from one class the protagonist 
missed. Accordingly, the favor the protagonist received in Yang et al.’s study was by far greater 
than the favor in our study. As regards the wrong behavior judgments, Yang et al. used a scale 
differentiating acts violating social norms, others’ rights, and family ethics, whereas we used a 
scale differentiating deception, disregard for others, failure to do good, laziness, bodily violations, 
and disgusting behaviors. Consequently, the wrong behavior judgments of the two studies are not 
directly comparable. Furthermore, note that neither moral perfectionism nor general 
perfectionism explained significant variance in laziness and bodily violations, which puts the 
relevance of these judgments for our study in question.  
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4.2. Limitations and future studies 
Our study had further limitations. First, it was the first psychological study to examine 
moral perfectionism in Western students, and not all relationships that Yang et al. (2015) found 
in Chinese students were replicated. In addition, the study included two variables—moral 
identity and moral disengagement—that Yang et al. (2015) did not examine. Consequently, 
future studies need to replicate our findings before firm conclusions can be drawn. Second, our 
sample was predominantly female (83%), so future studies should reinvestigate our findings with 
samples showing more equal proportions of men and women. Finally, the study solely relied on 
self-report. Whereas self-reports provide invaluable information (Baldwin, 2000), they introduce 
common method biases inflating the relationships between variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). While partial correlations and multiple regressions may control for 
common method variance, future studies should profit from including additional information 
(e.g., observer reports, behavior samples) to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the 
correlates of moral perfectionism.  
4.3. Conclusions 
The present findings make a significant novel contribution to the perfectionism literature. 
First, they indicate that moral perfectionism is a relevant personality characteristic explaining 
individual differences in moral attitudes not only in Asian, but also in Western samples. Second, 
they indicate that moral perfectionism explains individual differences in moral attitudes beyond 
general perfectionism. Furthermore, this effect does not seem to be limited to a few specific 
attitudes but encompasses a wide range of moral attitudes including moral values, virtues, 
judgments, identity, and disengagement. Although further research is needed to better understand 
the construct and the differences between the two dimensions of moral perfectionism, the present 
findings suggest that moral perfectionism is a useful construct that can explain why some people 
show greater morality in their everyday lives than others. 
 
Footnotes 
1Not to be confused with “overall perfectionism” or “total perfectionism” obtained when 
summing across different dimensions of perfectionism (e.g., Frost et al., 1990). 
2We deleted the “and like (dislike) them” part that Watkins et al. used to manipulate the 
valence of the benefactor. 
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Table 1 
Moral Perfectionism and General Perfectionism: Bivariate and Partial Correlations  
   Correlation 
 M±SD  1 2 3 4 
Moral perfectionism       
 1. Personal moral standards  3.22±0.74 .86  .67*** .43*** –.29*** 
 2. Concern over moral mistakes  2.95±0.74 .87 .70***  –.29*** .60*** 
General perfectionism       
 3. Personal standards 3.32±0.76 .85 .47*** .35***  .52*** 
 4. Concern over mistakes 2.78±0.75 .87 .40*** .64*** .55***  
Note. N = 238.  = Cronbach’s alpha. Bivariate correlations are displayed below the diagonal, 
partial correlations (controlling for the other dimensions of perfectionism) above the diagonal.  
***p < .001 
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Table 2 
Moral Perfectionism and Moral Attitudes: Personal Moral Standards (PMS) vs. Concern over Moral 
Mistakes (CMM) 
Moral attitudes  
  Bivariate 
correlations 
 Multiple regressionsa 
M±SD  PMS CMM  PMS CMM R² 
Moral values 4.09±0.54 .89 .40*** .21***  .35*** –.09 .17*** 
Virtues         
 Empathy 5.34±0.93 .93 .43*** .22***  .38*** –.11 .19*** 
 Order 4.23±0.91 .89 .35*** .26***  .25*** .01 .13*** 
 Resourcefulness 4.55±0.87 .85 .15* –.08  .29*** –.26*** .09*** 
 Serenity 4.06±1.21 .87 .30*** .13*  .29*** –.11 .10*** 
Forgiveness judgment 4.92±2.19 n/a .20** .10  .18** –.05 .04** 
Gratitude judgments         
 Gratitude 5.41±0.98 .96 .17** .00  .23*** –.16* .05** 
 Indebtedness 3.97±1.27 .85 .22*** .21**  .09 .08 .05** 
 Willingness to help  5.35±0.97 .94 .19** .02  .25*** –.16* .06*** 
MORAL PERFECTIONISM  16 
 
Wrong behavior judgments         
 Deception  3.49±1.06 .75 .29*** .23***  .17** .05 .08*** 
 Disregard for others  4.24±0.94 .68 .20** .16*  .13 .03 .04** 
 Failure to do good 3.40±1.13 .82 .23*** .12  .20** –.05 .05** 
 Laziness 1.83±1.19 .81 .05 .09  –.02 .08 .01 
 Bodily violationsb 2.49±1.27 .72 .08 .07  .04 .02 .01 
 Disgusting behaviors  3.68±1.20 .74 .01 .00  .01 –.01 .00 
Moral identity         
 Internalization 4.12±0.69 .88 .33*** .17**  .30*** –.09 .12*** 
 Symbolization 2.91±0.88 .88 .31*** .32***  .13* .14* .12*** 
Moral disengagement 2.77±0.98 .85 –.09 .08  –.20** .20** .05** 
Note. N = 238.  = Cronbach’s alpha. n/a = not applicable (single item). 
aPMS, CMM = semipartial correlations; R² × 100 = % of variance explained  
bbehaviors that involve the ingestion of foreign substances (e.g., drugs), certain sexual behaviors, and 
willful bodily disfigurement 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3 
General Perfectionism and Moral Perfectionism Predicting Moral Attitudes: Personal Standards (PS) and Concern over Mistakes 
(CM) vs. Personal Moral Standards (PMS) and Concern over Moral Mistakes (CMM)  











PS CM  PS CM R²  PS CM PMS CMM R² 
Moral values .27*** .12  .24*** –.03 .07***  .10 –.05 .27*** –.04 .10*** 
Virtues             
 Empathy .15* .00  .18** –.10 .03*  .03 –.14* .32*** .00 .19*** 
 Order .30*** .14*  .26*** –.02 .09***  .18** –.10 .14* .06 .07*** 
 Resourcefulness .34*** –.05  .44*** –.29*** .20***  .35*** –.16** .11 –.11* .02 
 Serenity .09 –.03  .13* –.10 .02  .02 –.12 .25*** –.02 .10*** 
Forgiveness judgment .05 .02  .05 –.02 .00  –.02 –.03 .17** –.02 .04** 
Gratitude judgments             
 Gratitude .12 –.09  .20** –.18** .05**  .12 –.14* .15* –.04 .03* 
 Indebtedness .11 .13*  .04 .09 .02  .00 .00 .08 .07 .03* 
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 Willingness to help  .15* –.05  .22*** –.16* .05**  .12* –.12 .16** –.05 .03* 
Wrong behavior judgments             
 Deception  .06 .06  .03 .04 .00  –.04 –.06 .16** .07 .09*** 
 Disregard for others .12 .05  .11 –.02 .01  .07 –.09 .08 .08 .04* 
 Failure to do good .08 .08  .04 .04 .01  –.05 .04 .20** –.06 .05** 
 Laziness .03 .15*  –.07 .16* .03*  –.07 .13* .02 –.01 .00 
 Bodily violationsb  .05 .12  –.03 .11 .02  –.05 .11 .07 –.05 .00 
 Disgusting behaviors  .14* .06  .13* –.03 .02  .13* –.01 –.04 –.01 .00 
Moral identity             
 Internalization .14* .00  .16* –.09 .03*  .05 –.12 .24*** .00 .11*** 
 Symbolization .23** .36***  .04 .28*** .13***  –.02 .19** .14* –.01 .03* 
Moral disengagement .00 .14*  –.08 .16* .03*  –.01 .09 –.17** .10 .03* 
Note. N = 238. Step 1, Step 2: See Section 3.3 for details. See Table 2 for the bivariate correlations of PMS and CMM.  
aPS, CM, PMS, CMM = semipartial correlations; R² × 100 = % of variance explained in Step 1 and additional variance in Step 2 
bsee Table 2 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Supplementary Material 
1. Moral Perfectionism 
1.1. Instructions 
Listed below are statements concerning moral standards and expectations. Please read each 
statement and decide whether you agree or disagree and to what extent. If you strongly disagree, 
choose 1; if you strongly agree, choose 5; if you feel somewhere in between, choose any one of 
the numbers between 1 and 5. If you feel neutral or undecided the midpoint is 3.  
1.2. Items 
1.2.1. Personal moral standards 
I have extremely high moral standards.  
It is important to me that I be thoroughly moral in everything I do. 
I set higher moral standards than most people.  
I am very good at focusing my efforts on attaining high moral standards. 
Other people seem to accept lower moral standards from themselves than I do. 
I expect to adhere to higher moral standards in my daily tasks than most people. 
If I do not set the highest moral standards for myself, I am likely to end up a second-rate 
person. 
1.2.2. Concern over moral mistakes 
I should be upset if I make a moral mistake. 
If I fail to adhere to my moral principles, I am a failure as a person.  
If someone shows behavior that is morally superior to mine, then I feel like I failed 
completely. 
If I fail to adhere to my moral standards partly, it is as bad as being a complete moral failure.  
I hate not adhering to the highest moral standards. 
People will probably think less of me if I make a moral mistake. 
If I am not as moral as other people, it means I am a morally inferior human being. 
If I do not behave morally all the time, people will not respect me. 
The fewer moral mistakes I make, the more people will like me. 
2. Forgiveness Judgement 
2.1. Vignette used in the present study  
Alex and Sam are classmates. They both worked in the same firm. Sam, who had been 
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working in the firm for several years, asked for a promotion. Alex, who was very talkative but 
not mean, disclosed some information about Sam’s professional life. Sam’s section head heard 
about this information and began to doubt the working qualities of Sam so they refused her/his 
promotion. Alex, remorseful, felt really sorry about what happened and asks Sam to forgive 
him/her. Right now, do you think that you would forgive Alex, if you were Sam?  
2.2. Original vignette (Girard & Mullet, 1997, p. 212) 
Marie-Noelle and Josiane are sisters. They both worked in the same firm. Josiane, who had 
been working in the firm for several years, asked for a promotion. Marie-Noelle, who was very 
talkative but not mean, disclosed some information about Josiane’s professional life. Josiane’s 
section head heard about this information and began to doubt the working qualities of Josiane so 
he refused her promotion. Marie-Noelle, remorseful, felt really sorry about what happened and 
asked Josiane to forgive her. Josiane’s best friend, who knows Marie-Noelle well, also asked her 
to forgive her sister. Josiane asked another section head for a promotion, again, which she has 
got at the present time. Right now, do you think that you would forgive Marie-Noelle, if you 
were Josiane? 
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